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Conditional Conservatism and Debt versus Equity Financing 
 
 
Abstract: Extant research suggests that conditional conservatism reduces information asymmetry between a firm 
and its shareholders as well as its debtholders. However, there is little evidence on whether conditional conservatism 
reduces information asymmetry differentially for shareholders and debtholders. We use the setting of a firm’s choice 
between equity and debt when it seeks a significant amount of external financing to examine this research question. 
We find that when firms raise a significant amount of external financing, the use of equity (versus debt) increases 
with the level of conservatism. We also find that the reduction in cost of equity associated with conservatism is 
greater for equity issuers than for debt issuers, but find no such difference when we examine cost of debt. In 
addition, we find that the positive effect of conservatism on the choice of equity issuance (versus debt issuance) is 
accentuated when the information asymmetry between the firm and its shareholders is more severe. Overall, our 
results suggest that conservatism reduces information asymmetry more between firms and shareholders than 
between firms and debtholders.   
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1. Introduction 
Conditional conservatism (hereafter, we use the terms “conditional conservatism” and “conservatism” 
interchangeably), imposes stronger verification requirements for the recognition of gains than for the recognition of 
losses, thereby speeding up the reporting of losses relative to gains (Basu 1997; Holthausen and Watts 2001).1 
Existing theories suggest several informational benefits of conservatism (e.g., Bagnoli and Watts 2005; Guay and 
Verrecchia 2007; Fan and Zhang 2012).2 Several studies document that conservatism is associated with lower 
information asymmetry between outside equity investors and the firm (LaFond and Watts 2008; Garcia Lara, Garcia 
Osma, and Penalva 2011, 2014; Kim and Zhang 2015). However, several other studies emphasize the informational 
role of conservative reporting in debt contracting (Zhang 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Beatty, Weber, and Yu 
2008; Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari 2008; Ball, Robin, and Sadka 2008; Li 2010; Nikolaev 2010). Given the existing 
findings that conservatism is associated with both lower cost of equity and lower cost of debt (Li 2014), it is unclear 
a priori whether conservatism is associated with a greater reduction in the cost of debt or the cost of equity, and 
what might cause this difference.  
We use the setting of a firm’s decision to issue equity versus debt when it seeks a significant amount of 
external financing to shed light on whether conservatism is associated with this choice. Specifically, if conservatism 
is associated with a relatively lower cost of equity (debt), we expect the likelihood of equity versus debt issuance to 
be greater (less) for firms with higher conservatism when they raise external financing. Following prior studies 
(Hovakimian 2004; Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary 2006, 2009), we use a logistic model with debt-equity choice as 
the dependent variable to examine the association between conservatism and debt versus equity issuance. To 
triangulate our inferences, we use three firm-year measures of conservatism: (1) conservatism ratio developed by 
                                                 
1 We focus on the informational benefits of conditional conservatism, i.e., reporting lower book values and lower net income 
when firms experience contemporaneous economic losses, but not symmetrically increasing book values and net income when 
firms experience economic gains. This definition is in contrast to that of unconditional conservatism, which is an accounting bias 
toward reporting lower book values of stockholder equity. Unconditional conservatism can simply be satisfied by expensing 
early, deferring revenue, or under-reporting income or book values on a regular basis, none of which is correlated with 
contemporaneous real income (Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2005).  
2 Conservatism is an important principle that has influenced financial reporting for a long time. Citing Penndorf (1933) and 
Littleton (1941), Basu (2009) indicates that conservatism has influenced financial accounting since the early fifteenth century. 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) provide evidence that conservatism existed prior to formal standard setting and regulation in the 
United States, which suggests that managers of U.S. firms have incentives to report conservatively even in the absence of 
mandated rules and regulations. Despite criticism of conservatism, there is evidence that U.S. financial reporting not only is 
conservative but has become increasingly conservative (Basu 1997; Pope and Walker 1999; Givoly and Hayn 2000; Holthausen 
and Watts 2001; Ryan and Zarowin 2003; Shroff, Venkataraman, and Zhang 2012). This longstanding resilience of conservatism 
suggests that U.S. firms may derive significant economic and informational benefits from conservative reporting. 
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Callen, Segal, and Hope (2010), (2) conservatism score developed by Khan and Watts (2009), and (3) cumulative 
non-operating accruals proposed by Givoly and Hayn (2000).  
Using a sample of firms that issued a significant amount of either debt or equity during the period 1994 
through 2010, we find for all three measures of conservatism that firms with higher levels of conservatism in the 
current period are more likely to issue equity versus debt in the following period. A shift in the three conservatism 
measures from the lowest to the highest decile increases the probability of equity (versus debt) financing by an 
average of 11 percent, which is economically non-trivial. In addition, using a change specification, we find that an 
increase in conservatism is associated with a greater likelihood of equity (versus debt) issuance, consistent with the 
findings using the level of conservatism. Based on changes in conservatism using all three measures, we find that a 
shift from the lowest to the highest decile increases the probability of equity (versus debt) financing by an average of 
6 percent. To complement our main findings based on firm-year conservatism measures, we also use Basu’s (1997) 
asymmetric timeliness measure and find that prior to capital issuance, firms that issue equity exhibit greater 
conservatism compared to firms that issue debt.   
To explore whether conservatism reduces information asymmetry between firms and shareholders more 
than that between firms and debtholders, we conduct two additional sets of empirical tests. First, we examine 
changes in cost of equity and cost of debt surrounding issuances of equity and debt. We find that the reduction in 
cost of equity associated with conservatism is greater for equity issuers than for debt issuers, but do not find such a 
difference for cost of debt. This result is consistent with conservatism reducing information asymmetry more for 
shareholders than for debtholders. Second, using analyst following, analyst forecast dispersion, dedicated 
institutional ownership, growth opportunities, stock illiquidity, and probability of informed trade as proxies for 
information asymmetry, we find that the positive association between conservatism and equity issuance is more 
pronounced when the information asymmetry between the firm and shareholders is more severe. This result suggests 
that information asymmetry is one channel through which conservatism is associated with firms’ financing choice. 
Lastly, we find that our main results are robust to several sensitivity checks, which include using alternative 
cut-offs and limits for our measure of debt-equity choice, excluding firms with mergers and acquisitions, ruling out 
the confounding effect of debt capacity, including firms that issue both equity and debt, and using a pure cross-
sectional approach to deal with serial dependence.  
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Overall, our results suggest that a higher level of conservatism is associated with a greater reduction in cost 
of equity than cost of debt, and this differential cost reduction increases the likelihood of firms raising external 
capital through equity than through debt. One possible explanation for this result is that debtholders have alternative 
mechanisms to protect themselves from the costs of adverse selection and moral hazard. For example, debt contracts 
include covenants to aid in monitoring managerial behavior. Another possible explanation is that part of a firm’s 
debt may have very low risk because it is collateralized and offers downside protection to debtholders. Because this 
low-risk portion of debt is less sensitive to changes in information, it mutes the informational benefits of 
conservatism for debt compared to equity. 
Our study makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, we extend the literature on the 
influence of financial reporting on external financing decisions (e.g., Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder 2008; Chang et 
al. 2009) by examining how conservatism, an important attribute of financial reporting, relates to a firm’s decision 
to issue equity versus debt. Second, we extend the literature on the economic implications of conservatism by 
documenting that conservatism is correlated with a firm’s financing choice.3 Third, we further inform the debate on 
the informational role of conservatism by documenting that conservatism in U.S. capital markets is associated with a 
greater reduction in cost of equity than cost of debt. This result contrasts with the evidence in Ball et al. (2008b) that 
the demand for conservatism across international capital markets is driven mainly by debt rather than by equity.4 
Our evidence also contrasts with that of prior studies that document a positive relation between conservatism and 
leverage (e.g., Callen et al. 2010; Khan and Watts 2009). One possible reason is that we use a restricted sample of 
firms with relatively large amounts of equity and debt issuances, and hence our results may not generalize to all 
firms. However, the evidence in our study is consistent with that documented by Ball and Shivakumar (2008), who 
find that U.K. firms report more conservatively prior to initial public offerings of equity capital, and Givoly, Hayn, 
                                                 
3 Prior research on the economic implications of accounting conservatism examines issues such as corporate governance, agency 
conflicts, cost of capital, and investment efficiency (e.g. Beekes, Pope, and Young 2004; Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Garcia 
Lara, Garcia Osma, and Penalva 2009a, 2009b; Francis and Martin 2010; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2011; Ahmed and 
Duellman 2011; Li 2014).  
4 One possible reason for this difference in findings between our study and Ball et al. (2008b) is that the level of sophistication 
and development of capital markets in the U.S. is different from that in other countries. In countries where the debt market is 
smaller and debtholders are less protected by securities regulation, there may be a higher demand by creditors for conservatism to 
improve contracting efficiency. Relative to the demand for conservatism by debtholders in these countries, the same demand in 
the U.S. may be weaker (and perhaps also weaker than the demand for conservatism by U.S. shareholders) because the U.S. debt 
market is more developed and creditor protection is stronger. Hence, our results based on U.S. data may not generalize to other 
countries, especially bank-centered, code law countries (see Ali and Hwang 2000; Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000). 
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and Katz (2010), who find that firms with public equity report more conservatively than firms with only public 
debt.5 
We discuss the prior literature and develop our main hypothesis in Section 2, outline the measurement of 
conservatism and describe the empirical tests in Section 3, discuss the sample and the data in Section 4, detail the 
results of our main analyses and of additional analyses that strengthen our inferences on the association between 
conservatism and financing choice in Section 5, discuss sensitivity analyses in Section 6, and present our 
conclusions in Section 7.   
2. Prior literature and hypothesis development 
Financial statements are the primary source of information available to outside investors about a firm’s financial 
performance. Hence, financial reporting affects the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors 
about a firm’s underlying fundamentals and has important economic consequences. For example, Aboody, Hughes, 
and Liu (2005) conjecture that better financial reporting quality mitigates the exploitation of private information by 
informed traders, and find that firms with better reporting quality have lower cost of capital and less profitable 
insider trades. Biddle, Hillary, and Verdi (2009) document a positive association between financial reporting quality 
and investment efficiency, and argue that their results are consistent with a reduction in information asymmetry 
between firms and external suppliers of capital when firms have higher reporting quality.  
Conservatism increases the usefulness of financial statements because it imposes stronger verification 
requirements for the recognition of unrealized gains than unrealized losses, which increases the timeliness of loss 
versus gain recognition (Basu 1997; Holthausen and Watts 2001; Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Existing theories 
suggest that conservatism mitigates information asymmetry between firm managers and outside investors, either by 
reducing the costs of adverse selection or moral hazard or both, and leads to informational benefits.6 For example, 
conservatism improves debt and compensation contracting efficiency (Göx and Wagenhofer 2009), safeguards 
against ex post opportunistic influence on accounting measurement by managers (Gao 2013), enhances information 
                                                 
5 However, using Korean data, Haw, Lee, and Lee (2014) find that private firms, but not public firms, report more conservatively 
when they issue public bonds for the first time.  
6 We view information asymmetry, which can be modeled either as adverse selection or moral hazard, as the root of the agency 
problems associated with the issuance of external financing. Because tracing out the exact path through which conservatism 
affects information asymmetry is beyond the scope of our study, we do not distinguish between the adverse selection and moral 
hazard aspects of information asymmetry. Rather, in the development of our hypotheses, we simply rely on the argument that 
conservatism reduces information asymmetry as a whole (either through mitigation of costs associated with moral hazard or 
adverse selection), and examine the differential effects of conservatism on information asymmetry reduction for shareholders 
versus debtholders.  
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quality (Fan and Zhang 2012), helps signal managerial private information (Bagnoli and Watts 2005), reduces 
investors’ uncertainty about firm value (Guay and Verrecchia 2007), and mitigates bankruptcy and operating cash 
flow downside risks (Biddle, Ma, and Song 2012a, b). Despite our understanding of the role conservatism plays in 
reducing information asymmetry between the firm and outside investors, an unaddressed issue in the extant 
literature is whether conservatism reduces information asymmetry more (or less) between firms and shareholders 
than between firms and debtholders. Using the setting of a firm’s decision to issue debt versus equity, we investigate 
the effects of conservatism on the differential reduction in information asymmetry between the firm and its 
shareholders and debtholders. 
One stream of literature suggests that conservatism reduces the information asymmetry associated with 
equity. LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that firm managers have strong incentives to transfer wealth from investors 
to themselves by inflating firms’ financial performance (and consequently stock prices). In the presence of 
information asymmetry between firm managers and outside equity investors, the markets recognize these incentives 
and impose a cost by reducing their bid prices for shares. LaFond and Watts (2008) contend that conservatism helps 
alleviate this cost of information asymmetry because it requires higher verification standards on gains, which curb 
managers’ propensity to overstate unverifiable gains, and lower verification standards on losses, which curb 
managers’ reluctance to report less verifiable losses. The net result under conservatism is to produce more and 
harder information than would be provided by accounting practices that apply equally strong verification standards 
to both gains and losses. In addition, because conservatism limits managers’ ability to overstate earnings and 
resources available to the firm, the resulting hard information serves as a benchmark for competing and softer 
information sources. LaFond and Watts (2008) report that conservatism increases following increases in information 
asymmetry between managers and outside shareholders, which supports their contention that shareholders demand 
and firms supply conservative reporting because it helps mitigate information asymmetry. 
Consistent with the finding of LaFond and Watts (2008), Garcia Lara et al. (2014) document that 
conservatism leads to a decrease in information asymmetry and a decrease in stock return volatility. In addition, 
Garcia Lara et al. (2011) find a significant negative relation between conservatism and the cost of equity capital. 
They argue that shareholders benefit from conservatism because it mitigates uncertainty about the amount and 
distribution of future cash flows as well as the volatility of future stock prices, which leads to increased information 
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precision and reduced cost of equity. Furthermore, Kim and Zhang (2015) show that conservatism is predictive of 
the risk of future stock price crash, which suggests that conservatism matters to outside shareholders.  
Another stream of literature emphasizes the role of conservatism in debt contracting and suggests that 
debtholders have a strong demand for conservatism. For example, Zhang (2008) presents evidence consistent with 
conservatism benefiting lenders ex post through the timely signalling of default risk (manifested through accelerated 
covenant violations), and benefiting borrowers ex ante through lower initial interest rates charged by lenders. 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) examines whether conservatism decreases information asymmetry for borrowers and 
finds that the bid-ask spread in the secondary loan market is lower for firms with higher conservatism. Consistent 
with the usefulness of conservatism in debt contracting, several studies document that conservatism plays an 
important role in shaping debt contracts (Beatty, Weber, and Yu 2008; Ball et al. 2008a; Li 2010; Nikolaev 2010).7  
Ball et al. (2008b) document that the demand for conservatism is primarily driven by debt rather than by 
equity markets. Their study, using an international setting, provides important insights into why debtholders may 
demand conservatism more than shareholders. First, timely recognition is more important for debtholders than for 
shareholders because many of the post-issuance contractual rights of lenders are couched in terms of financial 
variables that are based solely on reported financial statements (Smith and Warner 1979). Therefore, any 
information that is not reflected in the financial statements does not affect those rights. In contrast, shareholders are 
comparatively indifferent to whether gain and loss information is directly reflected in the financial statements or 
received via other sources, so long as they ultimately receive the information. Second, debt contract effectiveness 
increases with timely accounting recognition of economic losses as it leads to timelier revision of earnings and net 
worth, which in turn results in timelier violation of debt covenants. This process allows the efficient transfer of 
important decision rights from loss-making managers to lenders, making conservatism relatively more important to 
debt versus equity investors. Third, debt and equity investors’ demands for financial reporting differ with respect to 
the interaction between financial reporting and other forms of disclosures. To the extent that managers are 
disciplined to provide non-financial disclosures that are unbiased and informative, shareholders can gain from 
                                                 
7 For example, Beatty et al. (2008) find that firms make modifications to debt covenants in response to debtholders’ demand for 
conservatism, and that these modifications are less likely to be made when alternative demands for conservatism arising from 
litigation, tax, and equity are strong. Ball et al. (2008a) document that when a borrower’s accounting information possesses 
higher debt-contracting value, defined as the inherent ability of accounting numbers to capture credit quality deterioration in a 
timely fashion, information asymmetry between the lead arranger and other syndicate participants is lower. This lower 
information asymmetry allows lead arrangers to hold a smaller proportion of new loan deals. 
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sacrificing financial reporting timeliness for non-financial disclosure informativeness if such an approach leads to a 
net increase in total information.8 Thus, compared to debtholders, shareholders have less demand for conservatism.   
In summary, existing findings suggest that conservatism is valuable to both shareholders and debtholders 
because it mitigates either adverse selection or moral hazard by reducing information asymmetry between firm 
managers and outside investors.9 It is therefore difficult to determine a priori whether conservatism reduces 
information asymmetry more (or less) between firms and shareholders than between firms and debtholders. In other 
words, it is difficult to predict whether shareholders or debtholders demand conservatism more, and whether such 
differential demands affect the likelihood of a firm’s decision to issue equity versus debt when the need for external 
financing arises.10 Therefore, we state our hypothesis in null form:  
 H1: Ceteris paribus, conditional conservatism is unrelated to a firm’s choice between equity and debt when 
the firm raises external capital.    
Note that in developing our hypothesis, we mostly rely on theories and empirical evidence that speak to the 
information benefits of conservatism for issuance of public debt and equity. In private issuances of capital, 
financiers such as venture capitalists (or other types of private shareholders) and banks (or other types of private 
lenders) are likely to have alternative information sources and hence face less information asymmetry problems than 
public investors. In our research design and empirical tests to be discussed in the following section, we do not 
distinguish between private and public sources of external financing because of data availability. However, as our 
sample is restricted to issuances of significant debt and equity, our data likely capture public rather than private 
issuances of capital.  
3. Research Design 
                                                 
8 Gigler and Hemmer (1998) and Ball (2001) argue that managers are committed to accurate public disclosures about expected 
outcomes because managers know that they will ultimately be held more accountable for the disclosed information. 
9 In the development of Hypothesis 1, we rely on the premise that conservatism is beneficial because it reduces information 
asymmetry. However, there are financial reporting costs associated with reporting lower earnings and/or net worth (Shackelford 
and Shevlin 2001). For example, Zhang (2008) finds that conservatism increases the probability and the expected costs of debt 
covenant violations.  
10 Pecking Order Theory (POT) (Donaldson 1961, 1969; Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984) is a well-known theory of the 
choice of corporate financing that relies on the idea of information asymmetry. POT predicts that firms prefer internal to external 
financing, and when external financing is required, firms prefer debt to equity. However, some studies suggest that POT is not 
descriptive of firms’ financing policies. For example, Frank and Goyal (2003) show that over the period from 1971 to 1998, U.S. 
firms tend to fund their financing deficits using equity rather than debt. They also document that smaller firms, which are 
expected to have higher information asymmetry, issue relatively more equity than larger firms. Consequently, we do not rely on 
POT to make our predictions on how conservatism affects the choice of debt versus equity financing but instead focus on the 
differential effects of conservatism on information asymmetry reduction for shareholders versus debtholders. 
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In this section, we first discuss the three firm-year measures of conservatism used in our main empirical analyses. 
We then detail the empirical models that we use to test the association between conservatism and firms’ financing 
choice. 
Firm-year proxies for conditional conservatism 
We use three firm-year proxies for conditional conservatism that reflect the firm’s commitment to conservative 
reporting. Our first measure is the conservatism ratio developed by Callen et al. (2010), which is based on the 
variance decomposition methodology of Vuolteenaho (2002). Callen et al. (2010) define conservatism ratio as the 
ratio of the current earnings shock to total earnings news, which measures the proportion of the total shock to 
expected current and future earnings that is recognized in current year unexpected earnings. They show that firms 
with higher conservatism ratio have more leverage, higher volatility of returns, greater incidence of losses, more 
negative accruals, and higher volatility of earnings and accruals, consistent with prior evidence on the effects of 
conservative reporting on these firm characteristics. Following Garcia Lara et al. (2011), we use the three-year 
average of the conservatism ratio (CR) as our measure of conservatism in order to capture the persistence and 
commitment in a firm’s reporting practices.  
 Our second conservatism measure is based on Khan and Watts’ (2009) conservatism score, which relies on 
Basu’s (1997) measure of asymmetric earnings timeliness. Khan and Watts (2009) find that their conservatism 
measure is positively associated with firm age, length of investment cycle, and idiosyncratic uncertainty. They also 
show that their measure increases in response to the level of information asymmetry and the probability of litigation, 
consistent with prior studies that examine these associations (Basu 1997; Holthausen and Watts 2001; LaFond and 
Watts 2008). Khan and Watts’ (2009) conservatism score does not require a firm to have sufficient negative annual 
returns to proxy for negative information or a sufficiently long time series for firm-level conservatism estimation. In 
order to capture a firm’s commitment to conservative reporting, we use the three-year average of conservatism score 
(Cscore) as our second proxy for conservatism.   
Our third measure of conservatism is based on non-operating accruals as used by Givoly and Hayn (2000). 
A conservative accounting policy leads to more frequent and negative non-operating accounting accruals such as 
bad debt provisions, restructuring charges, and asset write-downs. Although some of these non-operating accrual 
items are dictated by GAAP, Givoly and Hayn (2000) argue that the timing or amount of most non-operating accrual 
items is subject to management discretion. Chen, Chen, and Cheng (2014) also make similar arguments about non-
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operating accruals and suggest that these accruals capture conditional conservatism. To mitigate the effect of 
temporary non-operating accruals that reverse in subsequent years and to capture persistence in a firm’s conservative 
reporting choices, we use the three-year average of non-operating accruals (NOPA) to measure conservatism. We 
multiply the non-operating accruals by negative one so that its value increases with the level of conservatism. 
We provide details on the computation of these three firm-year measures of conservatism in Appendix 1. 
Following prior studies (Garcia Lara et al. 2011; Louis, Sun, and Urcan 2012), we use the annual decile ranks of 
each of the three conservatism measures to reduce noise in the estimates and to mitigate concerns with non-linearity. 
We standardize these decile ranks to range between zero and one, with observations in the bottom decile taking the 
value of zero and observations in the top decile taking the value of one. We denote these standardized rank-
transformed variables as Rank_CR, Rank_Cscore, and Rank_NOPA. The estimated coefficients on these 
standardized rank-transformed variables in a regression model can be interpreted as the differential effects of 
conservatism between the top and bottom conservatism deciles.   
Logistic analysis of the likelihood of debt versus equity issuance 
We use logistic analysis to examine the relation between conservatism on the probability of a firm issuing debt 
versus equity. We set the dependent variable (DISSUE) equal to one if a firm’s net debt issue constitutes more than 
five percent of total assets and any net equity issue is less than five percent, and we set DISSUE equal to zero if a 
firm’s net equity issue constitutes more than five percent of total assets and any net debt issue is less than five 
percent.11 The logistic regression is as follows:  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=2         (1) 
In Appendix 2, we provide detailed descriptions of the variables used in equation (1). CON is Rank_CR, 
Rank_Cscore, or Rank_NOPA. The conservatism measures, as well as the control variables, are lagged one period 
with respect to the year of capital issuance. Using lagged variables is consistent with our expectation that the 
mitigating effects of reporting conservatism on information asymmetry precede the actual issuance of external 
                                                 
11 Following prior studies (e.g., Hovakimian et al. 2001; Korajczyk and Levy 2003; Leary and Roberts 2005; Chang, Dasgupta, 
and Hilary 2006, 2009), we use the five percent threshold to isolate significant debt or equity issuances that are most likely 
related to the need for external funding of intended corporate investment. We examine the sensitivity of our results to using 
alternative cut-offs and discuss the findings in Section 6. 
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financing.12 If higher conservatism is associated with a greater (lower) likelihood of equity than debt issuance, we 
expect a negative (positive) coefficient on CON.  
 We estimate equation (1) and calculate two-way clustered (by firm and year) standard errors to account for 
cross-sectional and serial dependence (Petersen 2009). Besides industry (IND) and year (YEAR) fixed effects, we 
also include several control variables that prior studies claim to affect the issuance of debt or equity. Prior studies 
document that unconditional conservatism is valued by debtholders (e.g., Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Harris 
2002; Watts 2003), and this effect may influence firms’ financing choice. We control for unconditional conservatism 
using a measure developed by Penman and Zhang (2002) that is based on LIFO reserve, R&D expenses, and 
advertising expenses measured over a five-year period. We include the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns 
(STDRET) to control for risk. In addition, we control for industry-adjusted median level of leverage 
(TARGET_GAP) because extant research documents that firms strive to maintain a target capital structure (Rajan 
and Zingales 1995; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman 2001; Frank and Goyal 2009). Prior studies document that 
larger firms are more likely to use debt, while growth firms are less likely to do so (Myers 1977; Fama and French 
2002; Frank and Goyal 2003). Therefore, we include firm size measured as the natural logarithm of the book value 
of total assets (LNASSET) and growth measured as the market-to-book ratio (MB)13 to control for these effects.  
We include stock returns (RET) one year prior to the issue year because firms are more likely to issue 
equity when their stock prices are rising, indicating overvaluation (Taggart 1977; Marsh 1982; Lucas and McDonald 
1990; Chang et al. 2006). We also include return on assets (ROA) and the presence of an accounting loss (LOSS) 
because theories on the trade-off between debt and bankruptcy risk suggest that leverage increases with profitability 
(DeAngelo and Masulis 1980; Hovakimian et al. 2001; Fama and French 2002). In addition, we include the level of 
cash (CASH) and the presence of credit rating (CRATE) because Hovakimian (2004) finds that firms with more cash 
are more likely to rely on equity financing, while Halov, Heider, and John (2009) find that firms with credit ratings 
                                                 
12 Note that we measure financing choice on an ex post basis, i.e., we measure the actual issuance of capital but do not ascertain 
when the decision to issue capital takes place. Using lagged values of conservatism in equation (1) simply allows for the 
informational benefits of conservatism to be realized before the actual issuance of debt or equity, which in turn allows us to 
examine the differential effects of conservatism on information asymmetry reduction for shareholders versus debtholders. 
Therefore, our empirical tests cannot distinguish between the scenario where managers vary the level of conservatism in 
anticipation of capital issuance, and the scenario where managers take as given the level of conservatism before deciding on debt 
versus equity issuance. However, in both scenarios, we expect that if the conservatism reduces information asymmetry more 
between firms and shareholders than between firms and debtholders, firms are more likely to issue equity (versus debt).   
13 As a robustness check, we also use sales growth as an alternative proxy for growth and obtain qualitatively similar results.  
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rely more on debt financing.14 We also include bankruptcy risk measured by the modified Altman Z-Score 
(ZSCORE) (Altman 1968; MacKie-Mason 1990) because firms with higher risk of default are less likely to use debt 
financing (Myers 1977; Chang et al. 2006; Frank and Goyal 2009).15 
We include firm age (AGE) to control for firm maturity because more mature firms raise more debt (Chang 
et al. 2009). We also control for assets-in-place by including tangible assets (TANG) because tangible assets can be 
used as collateral in debt financing. We include the ratio of research and development expenses to sales (R&D) 
because firms with greater intangible assets arising from research and development are less likely to use debt (Myers 
1977; Frank and Goyal 2009). Based on the tradeoff theory of capital structure, sizable tax loss carry forwards 
induce debt financing (Mackie-Mason 1990; Johnson 2003). Therefore, we include tax loss carry forwards scaled by 
total assets (TLCF). Finally, we control for corporate dividend payout policy (DIVIDEND) and auditor quality 
(BIG6) because Chang et al. (2009) find that firms with lower dividend payout ratio and Big-6 auditors are more 
likely to issue equity versus debt.       
4. Sample and Data 
Sample selection  
We obtain the samples for our empirical analyses from the Compustat database for the period 1994 to 2010 and 
extract data on stock returns from the CRSP database. As we require three years of data to estimate CR, Cscore, and 
NOPA, the period used in estimating our conservatism measures actually starts in 1991. We exclude firms in 
regulated industries (i.e., SIC codes 4900 to 4999) and financial industries (i.e., SIC codes 6000 to 6999). As 
discussed earlier, the dependent variable in the logistic regression, DISSUE, is a binary variable that equals one if a 
firm’s net debt issue constitutes more than five percent of total assets and any net equity issue is less than five 
percent (debt issuers). DISSUE equals zero if a firm’s net equity issue constitutes more than five percent of total 
                                                 
14 Consistent with prior studies, we use an indicator variable to capture whether the firm has a long-term debt rating assigned by 
Standard & Poor’s. As a robustness check, we follow Ashbaugh, Collins, and LaFond (2006) and code credit rating (RATING) 
from 1 to 7, with higher values indicating better investment grade, and use an indicator variable to capture missing data for credit 
rating (Dummy_RATING). Our results remain qualitatively similar when we replace CRATE with both RATING and 
Dummy_RATING.   
15 As a sensitivity check, we use Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt’s (2004) Black-Scholes market-based approach to 
construct a proxy for bankruptcy risk. When we replace the modified Altman Z-Score with this alternative measure, we find 
qualitatively similar results to those reported in Table 3 and our inferences remain unchanged.   
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assets and any net debt issue is less than five percent (equity issuers).16 This means that observations for which both 
net debt and net equity issues are greater than five percent (dual issuers) or for which neither is above five percent of 
total assets (non-issuers) are excluded from our main samples.   
Table 1 Panel A describes our sample selection procedure. For the sample based on the CR (Cscore; 
NOPA) measure, we begin with 24,987 (31,131; 44,803) firm-year observations with available data to calculate 
conservatism and the control variables. We then delete 19,875 (23,883; 33,101) firm-year observations that are non-
issuers, and 214 (564; 1,261) firm-year observations that are dual issuers. The resulting samples consist of 4,898 
firm-year observations (2,521 unique firms) when the conservatism measure is CR; 6,684 firm-year observations 
(3,280 unique firms) when the conservatism measure is Cscore; and 10,441 firm-year observations (4,845 unique 
firms) when the conservatism measure is NOPA. The sample size for the NOPA measure is much larger because of 
the less stringent data requirements for estimating conservatism.  
Panel B reports the distribution of our samples by industry based on the classification in Frankel, Johnson, 
and Nelson (2002). As shown in the panel, the industry distribution in our samples does not differ significantly from 
that of the Compustat population. For example, firms in Computers, Durable Manufacturers, Retail, and Services 
constitute a greater proportion of our sample, similar to the proportions exhibited in the overall Compustat 
population.    
Construct validity of conservatism measures 
We perform several tests to check the construct validity of our conservatism measures. First, we sort the sample into 
deciles based on the conservatism ratio (CR), and compute the median values of Cscore and NOPA in each CR 
decile. Untabulated results indicate that the median values of Cscore and NOPA exhibit a generally increasing, albeit 
not monotonic, trend across the CR deciles. Second, we calculate the rank correlations among the three conservatism 
proxies (i.e., CR, Cscore, and NOPA) using the median values of each proxy in each CR decile. The correlation 
between CR and Cscore is 0.76; between CR and NOPA is 0.67; and between Cscore and NOPA is 0.60, and all 
                                                 
16 Note that our dependent variable (DISSUE) is defined based on net equity (and debt) issue. That is, for equity issuance we 
subtract the sale of common and preferred stock from the repurchase of common and preferred stock, and for debt issuance we 
subtract the amount of debt reduction from the amount of debt issuance. As a sensitivity analysis, based on the samples with CR, 
Cscore, and NOPA as the dependent variable, we find that 44 percent, 40 percent, and 32 percent of the firm-year observations 
have share repurchases respectively. When we exclude these firm-year observations that have share repurchases from our 
analyses, we find qualitatively similar results.  
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correlations are significant at p <0.10. These results suggest that while the three measures may be capturing different 
aspects of conditional conservatism, they are largely measuring the same underlying construct.  
Third, we estimate the Basu (1997) measure of conditional conservatism using the observations in each CR 
decile portfolio.17 We then estimate the rank correlation between the median value of CR and the estimated Basu 
(1997) measure of conservatism in each decile, and find that the correlation is 0.66 and significant at p <0.05.  
Fourth, we calculate the difference in the Basu (1997) measure of conditional conservatism for the highest and 
lowest CR decile portfolios and find that the difference is significantly positive at p <0.01. These results suggest that 
CR and the Basu (1997) measure of conservatism capture a similar underlying construct. We repeat both analyses 
using decile portfolios separately constructed based on Cscore and NOPA to establish their association with the 
Basu (1997) measure of conservatism and find similar results.18 In summary, the results from our construct validity 
tests lend support to the validity of our three proxies in distinguishing between firms with varying degrees of 
conservatism. 
5. Association between Conservatism and Financing Choice: Main Analyses  
Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics (mean and median values) of the conservatism measures and firm 
characteristics for debt versus equity issuers. Note that, except for the variables CR and Cscore (and Rank_CR and 
Rank_Cscore), we report descriptive statistics for all variables using the largest sample that is based on NOPA 
(10,441 firm-year observations). As reported in the table, all the raw and ranked measures of conditional 
conservatism are significantly higher for equity issuers relative to debt issuers. These univariate results are 
consistent with more conservative firms issuing equity rather than debt when external financing is required. The 
univariate results show that unconditional conservatism, measured by PZ_score is also significantly higher for 
equity relative to debt issuers. The differences in other firm characteristics between equity and debt issuers captured 
by the control variables are all significant, suggesting that controlling for these firm characteristics is important in 
our multivariate analyses.  
                                                 
17 The Basu (1997) model is: Xi;t = β1 + β2 Di;t + β3 Reti;t + β4 Di;t*Reti;t + ei;t,  where X is earnings scaled by lagged market value 
of equity, Ret is fiscal year returns, D is an indicator variable that equals one if Ret is negative, and zero if Ret is positive. The 
coefficient on the interaction term (D*Ret) is the Basu (1997) measure of conditional conservatism (i.e., asymmetric timeliness). 
18 Specifically, the rank correlation between the median value of Cscore (NOPA) and the estimated Basu (1997) measure of 
conditional conservatism in each decile is 0.77 (0.75) and is significant at p <0.01. The difference between the Basu (1997) 
measure of conditional conservatism between the highest and lowest Cscore (NOPA) decile portfolios is statistically significant at 
p <0.01.  
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Conservatism and the likelihood of debt versus equity issuance  
Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (1).19 The coefficients on the proxies for conservatism, Rank_CR (-
0.383), Rank_Cscore (-0.993), and Rank_NOPA (-0.205), are all negative and significant at p <0.05, indicating that 
firms with greater conservatism in the current period are more likely to issue equity than debt when they require 
external financing in the next period.20 To assess economic significance, we calculate the marginal change in the 
probability of debt issuance when the conservatism variable shifts from zero to one, i.e., from the bottom decile to 
the top decile, holding other independent variables at their respective means. Based on the estimated coefficients on 
Rank_CR, Rank_Cscore, and Rank_NOPA, we find that the probability of debt issuance decreases by 6.78 percent, 
21.24 percent, and 4.88 percent, respectively, and each decrease is statistically significant at p <0.05.21 These 
changes in probability indicate that the relation between conservatism and debt (versus equity) issuance is 
economically nontrivial.  
Turning to the control variables, we find that unlike the conditional conservatism measures, unconditional 
conservatism (PZ_score) is not significantly associated with the choice between debt and equity issuance. The 
coefficients on the other control variables are mostly consistent with evidence from prior studies.  For example, the 
coefficient on growth opportunities (MB) indicates a negative association with the issuance of debt and the 
coefficient on industry-adjusted median leverage (TARGET_GAP) shows that firms strive to maintain a target 
capital structure. The negative coefficient on the loss dummy variable (LOSS) indicates that profitable firms are 
more likely to issue debt, consistent with the impact of profitability on debt versus equity financing. Firms with 
more cash (CASH), firms with greater stock returns (RET), and firms with greater R&D expenditure (R&D) rely 
more on equity financing, and mature firms (AGE) and firms with high dividend payout policy (DIVIDEND) are 
more likely to issue debt. However, the coefficients on STDRET, LNASSET, ROA, ZSCORE, and TANG have the 
                                                 
19 We find that all the variance-inflation factors are below 10 in the estimation of equation (1), which suggests that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to influence the results reported in Table 3 (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman 1996). 
20 We measure DISSUE based on net debt and net equity issuances. This measure takes into account debt reductions and share 
repurchases and is conceptually a measure of incremental external financing. Thus, the positive association between conservatism 
and incremental equity financing documented in this study does not necessarily contradict the positive association between 
conservatism and the level of debt (or leverage) documented in prior studies (e.g., Callen et al. 2010; Khan and Watts 2009). This 
is because a firm is likely to have an optimal or target leverage ratio that is determined by various factors, including 
conservatism, and will strive to maintain this optimal ratio over time despite incremental external financing that moves the firm 
towards or away from the optimum.  
21 The marginal effect of a one unit increase in each conservatism measure is computed as p x (1-p) x b (Liao 1994), where p is 
the base rate (77 percent, 68 percent, 60 percent for the models using Rank_CR, Rank_Cscore, and Rank_NOPA, respectively) 
and b is the estimated coefficient on the conservatism measure in equation (1).We use the “mfx” command in STATA to assess the 
statistical significance of the marginal effects. 
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predicted sign and are significant in only two out of the three regressions. In addition, we do not find a robust 
association between financing decisions and credit ratings (CRATE), tax loss carried forward (TLCF), and auditor 
quality (BIG6). 
 Overall, our findings in Table 3 indicate that conservatism is associated with greater probability of equity 
versus debt issuance. This greater probability of equity versus debt issuance suggests that conservatism reduces 
information asymmetry more between firms and shareholders than between firms and debtholders. Unlike 
shareholders, debtholders may have other means to protect themselves from the costs of adverse selection and moral 
hazard and may have alternative mechanisms in place to mitigate such information asymmetry. For example, 
covenants are included in debt contracts to aid in monitoring managerial behavior, including managers’ reporting 
and disclosure practices that reduce the information asymmetry between debtholders and the firm. Moreover, 
collateralized debt can offer downside protection to debtholders. 
Changes in conservatism and the likelihood of debt versus equity issuance 
Conservatism reflects accounting practices that firms have adopted as a matter of policy, and is unlikely to vary 
significantly from year to year.22 Therefore, we use three-year averages of CR, Cscore, and NOPA in our analyses to 
capture the persistence and commitment in a firm’s reporting choices. Although conceptually we do not expect 
conservatism to vary significantly from year to year, an advantage of using a change test is that each firm serves as 
its own control. This test relies on the assumption that unobservable underlying firm characteristics associated with 
financing choice remain constant over time. Therefore, as an alternative approach to deal with concerns about 
omitted correlated variables, we re-estimate equation (1) using lagged change in conservatism (ΔCON) instead of 
lagged level of conservatism (CON). We measure ΔCON as the difference in CON (i.e., CR, Cscore, and NOPA), 
which is based on three-year averages, between year t and t-1.23 We then transform ΔCON into decile ranks that 
range between zero and one (Rank_ΔCON), with a value of one (zero) for Rank_ΔCON indicating the decile with the 
                                                 
22 We assess the persistence of our three measures of conservatism. Specifically, for each conservatism proxy, we regress the 
current decile rank on the lagged decile rank of conservatism in a pooled regression. The closer the coefficient estimate on the lag 
conservatism measure is to one, the more persistent or stable the measure is over time. We find that the coefficient estimates on 
lagged Rank_CR, Rank_Cscore, and Rank_NOPA are 0.63, 0.97, and 0.69, respectively. These results suggest that the 
conservatism measures are fairly stable over time. 
23 Note that in essence, the difference in CON (a three-year average) between year t and t-1 is the difference in the annual 
measure of conservatism in year t and in year t-3 for a firm. Therefore, ΔCON captures the difference in conservatism for a firm 
over a three-year period, which is a measurement that is more consistent with the expectation that conservatism is not likely to 
vary much from year to year, but may vary more over a longer period of time.      
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largest (smallest) increase in conservatism. All the control variables are also measured as differences between year t 
and t-1 and are lagged one period from the period of measurement of capital issuance. 
Table 4 reports the regression results using changes in conservatism, Rank_ΔCON. The coefficients on 
Rank_ΔCscore and Rank_ΔNOPA are negative and significant at p <0.05 and the coefficient on Rank_ΔCR is 
negative but insignificant. We calculate the marginal change in the probability of debt issuance when the change in 
conservatism moves from the bottom to the top decile (i.e., when Rank_ΔCON increases from zero to one), while 
holding the other independent variables at their respective means. Based on the estimated coefficients reported in 
Table 4, the largest observed increase (i.e., a change from the lowest to the highest decile) in Rank_ΔCR, 
Rank_ΔCscore, and Rank_ΔNOPA decreases the probability of debt issuance by 1.51 percent, 9.64 percent, and 6.20 
percent (the last two percentages are statistically significant at p <0.05), respectively. The signs of the coefficients 
on the control variables are generally consistent with predictions, except for ΔROA, which has a predicted positive 
sign but negative coefficient estimates. Overall, these results indicate that increases in conservatism are associated 
with greater likelihood of equity (versus debt) issuance, consistent with our inferences based on the level of 
conservatism, and indicate that our results are robust to using a change specification that further addresses concerns 
about stationary omitted correlated variables.24  
Basu’s (1997) measure of conservatism  
To further triangulate our findings and inferences based on the three firm-year measures of conservatism, we 
examine the differential level of conservatism between the sample of equity issuers and the sample of debt issuers 
using Basu’s (1997) measure of conservatism in a single pooled regression. We modify Basu’s (1997) regression 
using the dummy variable DISSUE as defined in equation (1), which distinguishes between firms that issue equity 
and firms that issue debt. For each firm that issues equity (i.e., DISSUEi,T = 0) or debt (i.e., DISSUEi,T = 1) in year T, 
we use three years of prior data (i.e., year T-3 to T-1) to estimate the Basu (1997) regression. We use three years of 
prior data because we are interested in examining the level of conservatism before the capital issuance in year T.  In 
order to ensure a cleaner test of the association between conservatism and debt versus equity issuance, for each firm 
identified as either an equity issuer or a debt issuer in year T, we require that the firm does not issue any significant 
                                                 
24 As a sensitivity check, we also estimate a change specification using a dummy variable to indicate observations in just the two 
extreme deciles of change in conservatism (i.e., a dummy variable indicating observations with Rank_ΔCON equal to 0 and with 
Rank_ΔCON equal to 1). Using this restricted sample, we find qualitatively similar results (untabulated) to those reported in 
Table 4.  
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equity or debt during the period T-3 to T-1. As a result, we use a restricted sample of debt and equity issuers 
constructed from the samples we use to estimate equation (1) because we eliminate any firms that issue capital more 
than once within a 4-year window (i.e., T-3 to T).        
 Specifically, we estimate the following pooled regression using three years of data (T-3 to T-1) for each 
firm i that issues equity or debt in year T:25    
Xi,T = β1 + β2 Di,T + β3 Reti,T + β4 Di,T *Reti,T + β5 DISSUEi,T + β6 Di,T *DISSUEi,T + β7 Reti,T *DISSUEi,T  
+ β8 Di, T *Reti,T *DISSUEi,T + β9 SIZEi,T + β10 Di,T *SIZEi,T + β11 Reti,T * SIZEi,T + β12 Di,T *Reti,T *SIZEi,T  
+ β13 LEVi,T + β14 Di,T *LEVi,T + β15 Reti,T * LEVi,T + β16 Di,T *Reti,T *LEVi,T + β17 MBi,T + β18 Di,T *MBi,T  
+ β19 Reti,T * MBi,T + β20 Di,T *Reti,T *MBi,T + IND + YEAR + ei,T                (2)  
  
 
X is earnings scaled by lagged market value and Ret is fiscal year return, D is a dummy variable that equals one if 
Ret is negative, and zero if Ret is positive, and DISSUE is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm issues debt, 
and zero if a firm issues equity in the year of capital issuance. We include firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), and 
market-to-book ratio (MB) in equation (2) to control for the effects of these firm characteristics on conservatism. We 
also include controls for industry (IND) and year (YEAR). Of interest is the coefficient on D*Ret*DISSUE, which 
indicates the incremental degree of conservatism associated with the capital issuance. If prior to capital issuance, 
debt (equity) issuers are more timely in recognizing losses relative to gains compared to equity (debt) issuers, we 
expect the coefficient on D*Ret*DISSUE to be positive (negative).  
 We report the results of estimating equation (2) in Table 5. In Column 1, we report the results using only 
the DISSUE variable without any control variables. The coefficient on D*Ret is positive and significant at p <0.01, 
which indicates that equity issuers report conservatively before the capital issuance. Similarly, the sum of the 
coefficients on D*Ret and D*Ret*DISSUE is positive and significant at p <0.01, indicating that debt issuers also 
report conservatively before the capital issuance. More importantly, we find that the coefficient on D*Ret*DISSUE 
is negative and significant at p <0.01. For comparison, in Column 2 we report the results using only the control 
variables, while in Column 3 we report the results using the full specification of equation (2). In Column (3), we find 
that the coefficient on D*Ret*DISSUE remains negative and significant at p <0.01.26 Finally, we compare the 
                                                 
25 DISSUE in equation (2) takes on the same value over the period from T-3 to T-1 because for each firm i identified as a capital 
issuer in year T (DISSUEi,T), we align the observation with firm i’s data on returns, earnings and other control variables for the 
prior three years (e.g., Xi,t and Reti,t for year T-3 to T-1).  
26 Although our focus is on timely loss recognition, we note that the coefficients on Ret*DISSUE in Columns (1) and (3) are 
positive and significant at p <0.01, indicating that debt issuers exhibit more timely gain recognition than equity issuers prior to 
capital issuances.  
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regression specification in Column (2) to that in Column (3) and find an increase in adjusted R2 of 4.82 percent, 
which indicates that DISSUE has incremental explanatory power to firm size, leverage, and market-to-book ratio for 
explaining conservatism. Overall, these results indicate that while both debt and equity issuers exhibit conservatism 
prior to capital issuances, equity issuers exhibit relatively greater conservatism. The results are consistent with those 
obtained using the logistic specification based on firm-year measures of conservatism, and suggest that more 
conservatism is associated with greater likelihood of equity (versus debt) issuance.27  
Conservatism and costs of equity and debt  
Prior studies (Garcia Lara et al. 2011; Zhang 2008) provide evidence that conservatism benefits firms because it is 
associated with lower costs of equity and debt, while our finding indicates that higher levels of conservatism are 
associated with greater likelihood of equity (versus debt) issuances. To further explore our finding, we examine 
changes in the costs of equity and debt surrounding issuances of debt and equity.   
We use the following regressions to examine costs of equity and debt:  
COEi,t = a0 + a1CONi,t-1 + a2 DISSUEi,t + a3CONi,t-1 * DISSUEi,t + IND+ YEAR + e (3a) 
CODi,t = b0+ b1CONi,t-1 + b2 DISSUEi,t + b3CONi,t-1 * DISSUEi,t + IND + YEAR + e (3b) 
COE is cost of equity and COD is cost of debt. DISSUE is as defined in equation (1), i.e., an indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm issues debt and zero otherwise. CON is our decile rank proxy for conservatism. We measure 
ex ante cost of equity (COE) capital based on Easton (2004) and Botosan and Plumlee (2005), who use the PEG 
ratio to estimate implied cost of equity.28 We measure cost of debt (COD) as total interest expense divided by short-
term plus long-term debt. For an issuer to be included in the estimation of equations (3a) and (3b), we require the 
firm to have data to compute both the cost of equity and the cost of debt, which reduces our original sample size.  
In equations (3a) and (3b), we expect the coefficients on CON and the sum of the coefficients on CON and 
CON*DISSUE to be negative. That is, for both equity (coefficients a1 and b1) and debt (coefficients a1 + a3 and b1 + 
b3) issuers, a higher level of conservatism is associated with a lower cost of equity (COE) and a lower cost of debt 
(COD). The coefficient a3 in equation (3a) is the incremental effect of conservatism on cost of equity for debt 
                                                 
27 Instead of using a pooled regression with three years of data for each debt and equity issuer, we also estimate equation (2) 
annually for each year for the period T-3 to T-1. Based on untabulated annual regressions, the coefficient on D*Ret*DISSUE is 
negative and significant at p <0.01 in year T-1 and year T-2, and significant at p <0.10 in year T-3. Thus, we obtain qualitatively 
similar results to those reported in Table 5.  
28 We use the PEG measure because Botosan and Plumlee (2005) and Botosan, Plumlee, and Wen (2011) suggest that this 
measure performs better as a proxy for cost of equity relative to other measures used in prior literature. 
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(versus equity) issuers, while b3 in equation (3b) is the incremental effect of conservatism on cost of debt for debt 
(versus equity) issuers.  
In Table 6 Panel A, we first report the descriptive statistics for cost of equity (COE) and cost of debt (COD) 
for each sample based on the three conservatism measures. In Panels B and C, we report the results of estimating 
equations (3a) and (3b), respectively. The coefficients on CON are significantly negative in five out of the six 
regressions, consistent with equity issuers benefiting from lower cost of capital with increasing conservatism. In 
both panels, the sums of coefficients on CON and CON*DISSUE are negative and significant in four out of the six 
specifications, which indicates that debt issuers also benefit from lower cost of capital with increasing conservatism. 
These results are consistent with prior studies that document the mitigating effects of conservatism on costs of 
capital (Garcia Lara et al. 2011; Zhang 2008).  
In Table 6 Panel B, when the dependent variable is COE, the coefficients on the interaction term 
CON*DISSUE are all significantly positive. Thus, for a similar level of conservatism, equity issuers exhibit a greater 
decline in cost of equity than debt issuers. In Panel C when the dependent variable is COD, we find that the 
coefficients on the interaction term CON*DISSUE are all insignificant. This result suggests that the decline in the 
cost of debt associated with conservatism is not significantly different between debt and equity issuers. Thus, the 
results in Panel C suggest that while conservatism reduces the cost of debt for equity and debt issuers, conservatism 
does not lower the cost of debt for one type of issuer incrementally more than the other.  
In summary, the overall evidence in Table 6 suggests that the mitigating impact of conservatism on cost of 
debt applies equally to both debt and equity issuers. However, the mitigating impact of conservatism on cost of 
equity is more pronounced for equity issuers. Overall, the results suggest that the reduction in cost of equity 
associated with an increase in conservatism is greater than the reduction in cost of debt, consistent with the notion 
that conservatism reduces information asymmetry more for shareholders than for debtholders.  
Cross-sectional effects of information asymmetry  
In the development of H1, we rely on the premise that information asymmetry reduction is one channel through 
which conservatism affects financing decisions. Unlike shareholders, debtholders have alternative mechanisms (e.g., 
debt covenants, collaterals, etc.) to protect themselves from the costs of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Consequently the informational benefits of conservatism are likely to be greater for shareholders than for 
debtholders, and we find that the likelihood of a firm raising external capital through equity rather than through debt 
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increases with the firm’s conservatism. To lend support to this premise, we examine settings in which the 
informational advantage of conservatism is most likely to be accentuated for shareholders versus debtholders. If 
conservatism reduces information asymmetry more between firms and shareholders than between firms and 
debtholders, we expect the positive association between conservatism and equity financing to be stronger in poorer 
information environments where shareholders would have greater potential for information gains from conservatism.  
 We use several proxies to measure information asymmetry between the firm and shareholders. First, we rely 
on measures based on financial intermediaries. Prior studies find that analyst coverage is positively and analyst 
forecast dispersion is negatively associated with information asymmetry (e.g., Alford and Berger 1999; Hong et al. 
2000; Barron 1995; Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens 1998; Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina 2002). Therefore, we use 
the number of equity analysts following a firm in each fiscal year (ANALYST) and analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) 
as proxies for information asymmetry (Bhushan 1989, 1994; Bhushan and O’Brien 1990; Ho, Liu, and Ramanan 
1997). Prior studies (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Huddart 1993) suggest that because of 
the magnitude of wealth invested, large shareholders such as institutions are likely to actively monitor firms’ corporate 
activities and financial reporting quality (Velury and Jenkins 2006). In particular, dedicated institutions, are likely to 
be the type of large shareholders that seek to reduce information asymmetry between themselves and the firms through 
active monitoring because of their longer investment horizon (Bushee 1998; Chen, Hartford, and Li 2007). Hence we 
use the level of dedicated institutional ownership (DEDINST) as a proxy for information asymmetry between firms 
and shareholders. 
Second, we rely on growth opportunities to capture the quality of a firm’s information environment. 
Growth opportunities induce information asymmetry because the payoffs from potential investments in new 
technology or new markets are highly uncertain, but managers have incentives to overstate the benefits from such 
investments in order to attract additional capital and to possibly obtain private benefits. We capture growth 
opportunities based on a firm’s research and development expenditure (HIGH_R&D) because an asset created from 
R&D expenditures is likely to be more unique than a tangible asset, and can lead to greater information asymmetry 
(Aboody and Lev 2000). In addition, we use an inverse proxy for growth opportunities measured as the amount of 
tangible assets scaled by total assets (TANG).  
Third, we use two proxies from market microstructure to measure information asymmetry. The first is 
Amihud's illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ), which is a volume-based liquidity indicator that reflects the response of share 
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price to order flow (Amihud 2002). A higher illiquidity ratio indicates lower liquidity, which reflects greater 
information asymmetry between the firm and outside shareholders. The second proxy is the probability of informed 
trade (PIN), which reflects the difference in information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors 
(Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara 1997; Brown and Hillegeist 2007).29  
To examine the effects of information asymmetry on the association between conservatism and financing 
choice, we modify equation (1) by interacting the proxies for information asymmetry (IA) with the measures of 
conservatism (CON) as follows:  
 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=4       (4) 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 7 report the results of estimating equation (4) using proxies for information 
asymmetry based on financial intermediaries, growth opportunities, and market microstructure, respectively. For 
expositional convenience, we report only the coefficient estimates and significance levels for key variables. In Panel 
A, we find that the coefficients on CON are negative and significant in six (out of the nine) empirical specifications. 
More importantly, we find that the coefficients on CON*ANALYST and CON*DEDINST are positive and significant 
at p <0.10 in all empirical specifications, while the coefficients on CON*DISP are negative and significant at p 
<0.05 in two out of the three empirical specifications. These results indicate that firms with higher conservatism are 
increasingly more likely to issue equity (versus debt) when the information asymmetry between the firm and its 
shareholders, as measured by analyst coverage, forecast dispersion and dedicated institutional ownership, is greater.  
Turning to the results using growth opportunities, Panel B reveals that the coefficients on CON continue to 
be negative and significant in five (out of six) empirical specifications. Panel B also reveals that all the coefficients 
on CON*HIGH_R&D (CON*TANG) are negative (positive) and significant at p <0.10, which indicates that the 
positive association between conservatism and the likelihood of equity issuance (versus debt issuance) is stronger 
for firms with higher R&D expenditures and lower tangible assets. Panel C reports that the coefficients on CON 
remain negative and significant in four out of the six empirical specifications. The coefficients on CON*ILLIQ and 
                                                 
29 Note that the information asymmetry proxies we use are intended to capture the extent of information asymmetry that affects 
shareholders (rather than debtholders). This is because our purpose is to identify settings where the information asymmetry 
between the firm and outside equity investors is the most severe and where equity investors have the most to gain from the 
informational benefits of conservatism.  
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CON*PIN are all negative and significant at p <0.10, which is consistent with the inference that the likelihood of 
equity issuance by firms with higher conservatism is accentuated when information asymmetry is higher.  
Overall, the results in this section indicate that the reduction in information asymmetry associated with 
conservatism for shareholders (versus debtholders) is accentuated when the information asymmetry between the 
firm and shareholders is more severe.30 Consequently, the positive association between conservatism and equity 
(versus debt) issuance is greater because equity becomes relatively more attractive than debt. These findings lend 
further credence to our argument that conservatism reduces information asymmetry more for shareholders than for 
debtholders, and help strengthen our inference that information asymmetry reduction is one channel through which 
conservatism relates to financing choice.   
6. Association between Conservatism and Financing Choice: Sensitivity Analyses 
We discuss the results of several sensitivity tests in this section. For brevity, we do not tabulate the results.  
 Our results are robust to using three percent and one percent cutoffs (instead of five percent) to define 
DISSUE, implying that our earlier inferences are not restricted solely to firms with larger capital issuances. 
In addition,  to increase the power of our tests by increasing the distinction between debt and equity issuers, 
we set DISSUE equal to one if a firm’s net debt (equity) issue constitutes more (less) than five percent of 
total assets and only if the difference between the debt and equity issues is more than three percent of total 
assets. Similarly, we set DISSUE equal to zero if a firm’s net equity (debt) issue constitutes more (less) 
than five percent of total assets and only if the difference between the equity and debt issues is more than 
three percent of total assets. Using this restricted sample, we find qualitatively similar results.  
 In order to mitigate concerns that our results may be affected by firms engaging in mergers and 
acquisitions, we exclude such firms from the analyses and find that our results remain qualitatively similar 
to those reported in the tables.  
                                                 
30 Ai and Norton (2003) argue that the interaction effect in a non-linear model, such as the logistic specification of equation (4), 
cannot be evaluated and interpreted simply by looking at the sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of the coefficient on the 
interaction term. Rather, interpreting the interaction effect requires computation of modified statistics based on cross-derivatives 
or cross-differences. However, Greene (2010) contends that the modified statistics proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) do not 
provide meaningful interpretations and statistical inferences. In addition, Kolasinski and Siegel (2011) draw on the extant 
statistics literature (e.g., Le 1998) and show that the interaction coefficient and test statistic in a standard logistic specification are 
appropriate for research dealing with non-extreme probabilities and are economically meaningful. Therefore, we continue to 
estimate and interpret the interaction effects in equation (4). However, as a further robustness check, we calculate the modified 
statistics output, as suggested by Ai and Norton (2003), based on the “inteff” procedure in STATA. We find that the results and 
inferences based on the test statistic estimates output by the “inteff” procedure remain similar to those reported in Table 7.  
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 Firms with debt capacity are more likely to issue debt than equity, and it is possible that the positive 
association between the use of equity and conservatism is simply driven by conservative firms having no 
debt capacity. In order to mitigate this concern, we first sort our sample into terciles based on leverage 
(LEV) and asset tangibility (TANG). We classify observations in the bottom (top) tercile of leverage (asset 
tangibility) as firms with debt capacity. We then separately re-estimate equation (1) using these two 
subsamples of firms with debt capacity and find qualitatively similar results to those reported in Table 3.  
 In our main analyses, we exclude dual issuers (firms that have significant debt and equity issuances that 
constitute more than five percent of total assets) from our sample. As a robustness check, we include dual 
issuers in our sample and estimate a multinomial logistic regression where the dependent variable is a 
three-level indicator variable denoting equity issuers, debt issuers, and dual issuers. With equity issuers as 
the base group for comparison, we continue to find that conservatism significantly increases the likelihood 
of equity relative to debt issuance after including dual issuers.  
 In our analyses so far, we rely on panel data and use two-way clustered standard errors to correct for serial 
dependence.31 As an alternative approach to deal with serial dependence, we conduct a pure cross-sectional 
analysis by keeping only the first debt or equity issuance observation per firm and re-estimating equation 
(1). We continue to find that the coefficient on conservatism in equation (1) is negative and significant, 
indicating that our results are robust to this alternative approach to dealing with serial dependence. 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
Prior research suggests that conservatism reduces the information asymmetry between the firm and its shareholders 
as well as its debtholders. However, little is known about whether conservatism reduces information asymmetry 
more (or less) between firms and shareholders than between firms and debtholders. We examine this research 
question by analyzing firms’ decisions to issue equity versus debt.  
We use three measures of conditional conservatism based on Callen et al. (2010), Khan and Watts (2009), 
and Givoly and Hayn (2000) and find that the use of equity (versus debt) increases with the level of conservatism 
when firms raise a significant amount of external financing. Our findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity 
                                                 
31 In our sample, there are 3,825 (2,738) unique debt (equity) issuers that raise debt (equity) an average of 1.94 (1.78) times over 
the sample period. For firms that issue capital more than once in our sample, the mean number of years between capital issuance 
is 2.44 years. 
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checks. We also find that the reduction in the cost of equity associated with conservatism is greater for large equity 
issuers than for large debt issuers, but do not find an analogous difference when we examine the cost of debt. In 
addition, we find that the association between conservatism and the issuance of equity (versus debt) is stronger when 
there is greater information asymmetry between firms and shareholders. These additional results suggest that 
conservatism reduces information asymmetry more between firms and shareholders than between firms and 
debtholders.  
We acknowledge several important caveats related to our study. First, while we find that conservatism is 
associated with a greater reduction in cost of equity than cost of debt for firms that issue significant amounts of debt 
or equity, our findings also indicate that conservatism is associated with a reduction in both the cost of equity and 
the cost of debt. Second, although our findings suggest that conservatism is associated with lower information 
asymmetry, we note that our study is not designed to distinguish whether the effect is associated with the moral 
hazard or the adverse selection aspects of information asymmetry, or indeed, some other (correlated) channel such 
as litigation risk. Third, our results are obtained based on an outlying sample of large equity or debt issuers (i.e., 
firms with significant financing needs) and hence may not generalize to all firms. Fourth, although we use several 
measures of conditional conservatism and employ different alternative tests to triangulate our results, our inferences 
ultimately depend on how well these conservatism measures capture the underlying construct of conservative 
reporting. Fifth, our results are specific to the U.S. and may not carry over to other countries with different 
institutional settings such as bank-centric, code law countries. Sixth, our models assume linear effects of firm 
characteristics, but the true model may not be linear. Seventh, we do not attempt to directly address endogeneity or 
joint causation and hence the association between conservatism and the choice between debt and equity may be 
driven by some underlying firm characteristics that we do not adequately control for in our empirical specifications. 
 Despite these limitations, our study provides valuable insight into the relation between conditional 
conservatism and firms’ external financing decisions. Our study extends extant research on the economic 
implications of accounting conservatism by examining the role of financial reporting in firms’ financing decisions, 
and helps inform the debate on the informational role of accounting conservatism.  
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Appendix 1 
Measuring Conditional Conservatism 
 
Conservatism Ratio (CR) 
 
The conservatism ratio (CR) measures the proportion of the total shock to current and expected future cash 
flows that is recognized in current year earnings. In the case of adverse (positive) cash flow news, a higher (lower) 
proportion of the news is recognized in current earnings because of the asymmetric treatment of negative and 
positive shocks by the accounting system.  
We compute CR using Callen et al.’s (2010) approach, which is based on Vuolteenaho’s (2002) return 
decomposition model. Vuolteenaho (2002) shows that shocks to returns can be decomposed into: (1) shocks to 
current and future dividends or cash flows, and (2) shocks to current and future discount rates. Based on the clean 
surplus relation, shocks to returns can be expressed in terms of shocks to current and expected future earnings 
(instead of dividends or cash flows) and shocks to current and future discount rates as follows: 
rt – Et-1(rt) = Net – Nrt                                    (A1) 
rt is the market rate of return, Et-1(rt) is the expected market rate of return, Net is earnings news (or total shocks to 
current and future earnings), and Nrt is discount rates news (or total shocks to current and future discount rates). 
Equation (A1) shows that unexpected revision to current stock returns increases with earnings news and decreases 
with discount rate news.  
In order to estimate CR, a measure of earnings news (Net) and a measure of the amount of earnings news 
that is captured in current accounting earnings are required. To derive these measures, we follow the detailed 
methodology set out in Callen and Segal (2010). First, we estimate a log-linear vector autoregressive (VAR) model 
consisting of the following system of equations with three state variables, r, roe and bm (the firm subscript, i, is 
omitted for expositional convenience): 
rt = α1 rt-1 + α2 roet-1 + α3 bmt-1 + η1t                     (A2a) 
roet = β1 rt-1 + β2 roet-1 + β3 bmt-1 + η2t                                 (A2b) 
bmt = δ1 rt-1 + δ2 roet-1 + δ3 bmt-1 + η3t                   (A2c) 
The return variable r equals the log of one plus the annual return (12-month returns beginning 3 months after prior 
fiscal year end) minus the log of one plus the annualized three-month T-bill rate. The earnings variable roe is the log 
of one plus returns on equity (ROE) minus the log of one plus the annualized three month T-bill rate. ROE is 
computed as income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning book value of equity.  bm equals the log of the 
book-to market ratio at fiscal year-end. We estimate the VAR model by Fama and French (1997) industry grouping 
using weighted least squares based on one pooled regression per system equation. Each annual cross-section is 
weighted equally by deflating the data for each-firm year by the number of firms in that year. All variables in the 
system of equations (A2) are demeaned. We exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), observations with market 
value of equity below $10 million, and observations in the top and bottom 1 percent distribution of each variable. 
From the estimation of system of equations (A2), we use the VAR matrix of estimated coefficients and the 
vectors of residuals η to derive unexpected shock to returns (rt – Et-1(rt)), earnings news (Net), and discount rate 
news (Nrt) as follows: 
ri,t – Ei,t-1(ri,t) = η1i,t                                               (A3a) 
Nei,t = e2’(I – ρA)-1 ηi,t                                                 (A3b) 
Nri,t = e1’ρA(I – ρA)-1 ηi,t                     (A3c) 
A is the matrix of coefficients estimated from equations (A2).  e1’ and e2’ are vectors equal to [1, 0, 0] and [0, 1, 0], 
respectively. I is the identity matrix and ρ is a constant equal to 0.967. ηi,t is the vector [η1i,t, η2i,t, η3i,t]’.   
To calculate CR, we use earnings news (Ne) estimated from equation (A3b) and the residuals (η2) from 
equation (A2b), which proxies for current period unexpected earnings. Specifically,  
CRi,t = η2 i,t / Nei,t                        (A4) 
CR measures the amount of total shocks to current and future earnings (Ne) that is captured by current period 
unexpected earnings (η2). A larger value of CR indicates greater conditional conservatism. We use the average of 
CR over three years as our proxy for conditional conservatism.  In equation (1), we use the lagged decile rank of CR, 
Rank_CR, as our primary test variable.    
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
Measuring Conditional Conservatism 
 
Conservatism Score (Cscore) 
 
The conservatism score (Cscore) is based on the Basu’s (1997) conservatism regression, which is as 
follows:  
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽1,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑡𝐷𝑖,𝑡+𝛽3,𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (A5)                                                            
X is income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value. R is annual returns compounded from 
monthly returns ending three month after fiscal year end. D is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms 
with negative returns, and zero otherwise. ε is the residual. In equation (A5), 𝛽3 captures the timeliness of good 
news. 𝛽4 is the measure of conditional conservatism that captures the incremental timeliness of bad news relative to 
good news.  
Based on equation (A5), Khan and Watts (2009) express the timeliness of good news (𝛽3) and the 
incremental timeliness of bad news relative to good news (𝛽4) as linear functions of three time-varying firm-specific 
characteristics: size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage.  These three characteristics are shown vary conceptually 
and empirically with conditional conservatism. Specifically the following identities are stated:     
𝐺𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  𝛽3,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜇3𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡                   (A6a) 
𝐶𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  𝛽4,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜆3𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡                            (A6b) 
Gscore is the timeliness of good news, and Cscore is the incremental timeliness of bad news. SIZE is the 
natural log of market value of equity, MB is the market-to-book ratio, and LEV is the sum of long term and short 
term debt divided by market value of equity. i and i are constant across firms, but vary across time.   
Equations (A6a) and (A6b) are substituted into equation (A5) to yield the following empirical equation:  
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽 + 𝛽2,𝑡𝐷𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜇3𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +  
  𝐷𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ (𝜆1 + 𝜆2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝜆3𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                          (A7)  
Following Khan and Watts (2009), we estimate equation (A7) annually to obtain the year-specific 
estimated parameters, i and i.  We then substitute i into equation (A6b), along with firm-specific measures of 
firm size (SIZE), market-to-book (MB) and leverage (LEV) to obtain the firm-year specific Cscore. In our estimation 
of (A7) we exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999). We also exclude observations with (1) missing data for any of 
the variables in the equation, (2) negative total assets or book value of equity, (3) price per share less than one, and 
(4) in the top and bottom one percent distribution of earnings, returns, size, market-to-book ratio and leverage in 
each year. We use the average of the Cscore over three years as our proxy for conditional conservatism.  In equation 
(1), we use the lagged decile rank of Cscore, Rank_Cscore, as our primary test variable.    
 
 
Non-operating Accruals (NOPA) 
 
Following Givoly and Hayn (2000), we measure non-operating accruals as:  
Non-operating accruals = Total accruals before depreciation − Operating accruals  
  = [(Net Income + Depreciation) − Cash flow from operations]  
     − (Δ Accounts receivable + Δ Inventories +Δ Prepaid expenses  
     − Δ Accounts payable − Δ Taxes payable).  
We average the non-operating accruals over a three-year period to obtain NOPA, our proxy for conditional 
conservatism. In equation (1), we use the lagged decile rank of NOPA, Rank_NOPA, as our primary test variable.    
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Appendix 2 
Variable Definitions 
 
DISSUE Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s net debt issue constitutes more than 5 percent of 
beginning total assets and any net equity issue is less than 5 percent of beginning total assets, 
and 0 if a firm’s net equity issue constitutes more than 5 percent of beginning total assets 
and any net debt issue is less than 5 percent of beginning total assets. Net Debt issued is 
long-term debt issued (DLTIS) minus long-term debt reduction (DLTR)], scaled by 
beginning total assets (AT). Net equity issued is sale of common stock and preferred stock 
(SSTK) minus purchase of common stock and preferred stock (PRSTKC), scaled by 
beginning total assets (AT). 
Rank_CR Annual decile rank of CR, scaled to lie between 0 and 1. CR is the three-year average of the 
conservatism ratio developed by Callen et al. (2010), using variance decomposition 
methodology of Vuolteenaho (2002). Higher values of CR indicate higher level of 
conservatism. The measurement of CR is detailed in Appendix 1.  
Rank_Cscore Annual decile rank of Cscore, scaled to lie between 0 and 1. Cscore is the three-year average 
of the conservatism score derived from linear functions of three firm-specific 
characteristics: size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage, and computed as in Khan and 
Watts (2009). Higher values of Cscore indicate higher level of conservatism. The 
measurement of Cscore is detailed in Appendix 1. 
Rank_NOPA Annual decile rank of NOPA, scaled to lie between 0 and 1. NOPA is the three-year average 
of non-operating accruals as in Givoly and Hayn (2000), Higher values of NOPA indicate 
higher level of conservatism. The measurement of NOPA is detailed in Appendix 1. 
PZ_score Proxy for unconditional conservatism developed by Penman and Zhang’s (2002), and is 
constructed from unrecorded reserves from LIFO inventory method (LIFR), R&D expenses 
(XRD), and advertising expenses (XAD) measured over a five-year period. 
STDRET Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year.   
TARGET_GAP Median leverage of firms with the same four-digit SIC code minus the firm’s leverage in 
the prior period.  Leverage is measured as by book value of debt scaled by total assets (AT), 
where book value of debt is long-term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC). 
LNASSET Natural logarithm of book value of total assets (AT). 
MB Market value to book value ratio calculated as total assets (AT) minus book value of equity 
(CEQ) plus market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F), divided by  total assets (AT), all 
measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
RET Holding period stock return over the last fiscal year prior to issue year. 
ROA Return on assets is the ratio of operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) to beginning 
total assets (AT).  
LOSS Dummy variable that equals 1 if net income (NI) is less than zero, 0 otherwise. 
CASH Cash and short term investments (CHE) divided by total assets (AT). 
CRATE Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has a long-term debt rating assigned by Standard 
& Poor’s (SPLTICRM), 0 otherwise. 
ZSCORE Modified Altman Z-score measured as [3.3× pretax income (PI) + sales (SALE) + 1.4× 
retained earnings (RE) + 1.2× (current assets (ACT) - current liabilities (LCT))] / total assets 
(AT). 
AGE Number of years the firm is listed in COMPUSTAT. 
TANG Tangible assets is net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) scaled by total assets (AT). 
R&D Research and development expenses (XRD) scaled by total sales (AT). 
TLCF Tax loss carried forward (TLCF) scaled by total assets (AT). 
DIVIDEND Ratio of dividends (DV) to total assets (AT). 
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
Variable Definitions 
 
BIG6 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the audit code (AU) is between 1 and 8, 0 otherwise. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F). 
LEV Book value of debt scaled by market value of equity (CSHO*PRCC_F), where book value 
of debt is long-term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC). 
COE Measure of cost of equity, based on Easton (2004) and Botosan and Plumlee (2005): 
√
𝑒𝑝𝑠5 − 𝑒𝑝𝑠4
𝑃0
 
where eps5 (eps4) refers to analysts’ forecast of five-year (four-year) ahead earnings and P0 
refers to current stock price. Forecasts are obtained from I/B/E/S database, current stock 
prices obtained from CRSP and measured at the end of the fiscal year. If eps3 through eps5 
are missing, we follow Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2008) by applying the following 
relation: epst+τ = epst+τ-1 x (1 + ltg) where ltg is the long-term earnings growth. To mitigate 
the effects of outliers, we restrict COE to lie between 0 and 1.  
COD Cost of debt measured as interest paid (INTPN) divided by the sum of short and long term 
debt (DLC+DLTT). To mitigate the effects of outliers, we restrict COD to lie between 0 
and 1. 
ANALYST Log of number of analysts following a firm. 
DISP Inter-analyst standard deviation of EPS forecasts deflated by absolute value of earnings. 
DEDINST Percent of shares held by dedicated institutional investors as defined in Bushee (1998). 
HIGH_R&D Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s research and development expenditure (scaled 
by total assets) is in the highest quartile of the sample, 0 otherwise. 
ILLIQ Illiquidity ratio developed by Amihud (2002) defined as the mean of the square root of the 
ratio of firm i’s daily absolute stock return to the reported daily dollar volume (in millions) 
over all days in fiscal year τ with nonzero volume. 
PIN The probability of informed trades from Brown and Hillegeist (2007), available for 
download at http:// www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/sbrown/.  
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TABLE 1  
Sample selection and distribution by industry 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 CR 
sample 
Cscore 
sample 
NOPA 
sample 
Firm years with available data on conservatism and control variables 24,987 31,131 44,803 
Less: Non-issuers (both net debt and net equity issuance less than 5% of 
total assets) 
 
(19,875) 
 
(23,883) 
 
(33,101) 
 5,112 7,248 11,702 
Less: Dual issuers (both net debt and net equity issuance more than 5% 
of total assets) 
 
(214) 
 
(564) 
 
(1,261) 
    
Final sample 4,898 6,684 10,441 
    
Panel B: Distribution by industry 
 Percentage of firm-year observations 
Industry CR sample Cscore sample NOPA sample Compustat sample 
Agriculture 0.49% 0.45% 0.34%  0.48% 
Chemicals 3.67% 3.13% 2.81% 2.70% 
Computers 11.92% 14.06% 16.06% 17.89% 
Durable manufacturers 27.85% 27.80% 25.79% 23.78% 
Extractives 6.55% 6.25% 6.10%   5.44% 
Food 3.72% 3.28% 3.11%   2.65% 
Mining and construction 3.10% 2.60% 2.84%   4.35% 
Pharmaceuticals 4.96% 6.76% 8.75%   6.88% 
Retail 14.68% 13.46% 12.01% 11.29% 
Services 10.41% 10.62% 10.38% 11.52% 
Textile and printing/publishing 6.08% 5.55% 4.90%   5.01% 
Transportation 6.55% 6.03% 6.90%   7.99% 
     
Total firm-years 4,898 6,684 10,441 120,366 
 
Notes: Panel A summarizes our sample selection procedures. With respect to the Non-issuers observations, for the (1) CR 
sample, the mean of CR, ratio of net debt issuance to total assets (Debt/TA), and ratio of net equity issuance to total assets 
(Equity/TA) is 0.259, -0.015, and -0.014 respectively; (2) Cscore sample, the mean of Cscore, Debt/TA, and Equity/TA is 
0.032, -0.016, and -0.013 respectively; (3) NOPA sample, the mean of NOPA, Debt/TA, and Equity/TA is 0.033, -0.019, 
and -0.011 respectively. With respect to the Dual issuers observations, for the (1) CR sample, the mean of CR ratio, 
Debt/TA, and Equity/TA is 0.599, 0.160, and 0.125 respectively; (2) Cscore sample, the mean of Cscore, Debt/TA, and 
Equity/TA is 0.072, 0.176, and 0.184, respectively; (3) NOPA sample, the mean of NOPA, Debt/TA, and Equity/TA is 
0.079, 0.240, and 0.248, respectively. Panel B reports the sample compositions, as well as the overall Compustat sample, 
by key industries. Industry membership is determined by SIC code as follows: Agriculture (0100–0999), Chemicals 
(2800–2824, 2840–2899), Computers (3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379), Durable manufacturers (3000–3999, 
excluding 3570–3579 and 3670–3679), Extractives (2900–2999, 1300–1399), Food (2000–2111), Mining and 
construction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399), Pharmaceuticals (2830–2836), Retail (5000–5999), Services (7000–
8999, excluding 7370–7379), Textiles and printing/publishing (2200–2799), and Transportation (4000–4899).   
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TABLE 2  
Descriptive statistics 
 
 Debt Issuers Equity Issuers   
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Diff. in Means 
(t-statistic) 
Diff. in Medians 
(z-statistic) 
CR 0.614 0.243 1.462 0.272  -4.23***     -3.92*** 
Rank_CR 0.491 0.444 0.532 0.556  -3.74***     -3.74*** 
Cscore 0.022 0.021 0.124 0.124 -28.09***   -26.77*** 
Rank_Cscore 0.435 0.444 0.664 0.778 -28.85***   -26.62*** 
NOPA 0.037 0.024 0.072 0.043 -15.39***   -15.86*** 
Rank_NOPA 0.438 0.444 0.536 0.556 -15.91***   -15.87*** 
PZ_score 0.090 0.019 0.256 0.082 -5.85***   -18.93*** 
STDRET 0.139 0.117 0.220 0.189 -36.80***    -41.97*** 
TARGET_GAP -0.041 -0.007 -0.060 0.000    4.49***  -1.87* 
LNASSET 5.754 5.751 4.060 3.864 44.38***     40.72*** 
MB 1.904 1.519 3.561 2.291 -26.35***    -30.88*** 
RET 0.190 0.161 0.361 0.293      -11.37***           -9.75*** 
ROA 0.110 0.134 -0.142 -0.005 36.48***      43.74*** 
LOSS 0.231 0.000 0.644 1.000 -44.89***    -42.10*** 
CASH 0.104 0.047 0.283 0.198 -39.42***    -37.07*** 
CRATE 0.296 0.000 0.093 0.000  27.87***     24.54*** 
ZSCORE 1.351 1.791 -2.219 -0.151  30.68***     44.33*** 
AGE 18.385 13.000 12.329 9.000  28.04***     23.99*** 
TANG 0.340 0.273 0.233 0.144  22.55***     25.80*** 
R&D 0.029 0.000 0.144 0.066 -33.78***    -38.46*** 
TLCF 0.164 0.000 0.932 0.000 -19.25***    -20.17*** 
DIVIDEND 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000  22.76***     28.42*** 
BIG6 0.853 1.000 0.760 1.000  11.57***     11.99*** 
 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics (mean and median values) of the conservatism measures and the control 
variables for debt issuers and equity issuers. The last two columns report test statistics for differences in these variables 
between the two groups of issuers. The descriptive statistics for all variables (except CR and Cscore) are based on the 
largest sample when conservatism is measured by NOPA (N=10,441). The descriptive statistics for CR (Cscore) are 
based on 4,898 (6,684) firm-year observations. Based on the NOPA sample reported in the table, 6,414 firm-years (61 
percent) are debt issuers while 4,027 firm-years (39 percent) are equity issuers. For the CR sample, 3,775 firm-years 
(77 percent) are debt issuers while 1,123 firm-years (23 percent) are equity issuers. For the Cscore sample, 4,616 firm-
years (69 percent) are debt issuers while 2,068 firm-years (31 percent) are equity issuers. The mean number of times 
a firm raises debt (equity) during the sample period is 1.88 (1.76). See Appendix 2 for detailed variable definitions. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests. 
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TABLE 3  
Conservatism and the likelihood of debt versus equity financing 
 
 
 CON = Rank_CR 
(1)  
CON = Rank_Cscore 
(2)  
CON = Rank_NOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coeff. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
Intercept +/-  1.862  1.87*   1.784   2.32**   0.323       0.49 
CON +/- -0.383 -2.84***  -0.993  -3.23***  -0.205      -2.40** 
PZ_score +/-  -0.085 -1.03   -0.035  -0.70   -0.038      -1.33 
STDRET - -0.975 -1.00  -1.436  -1.79**  -1.412      -3.74*** 
TARGET_GAP +  1.494  5.46***   1.140   5.59***   0.246       1.35* 
LNASSET +  0.195  5.07***   0.042   0.89   0.235       9.04*** 
MB - -0.313 -6.78***  -0.193  -5.70***  -0.094     -3.74*** 
RET - -0.495 -6.23***  -0.441  -6.97***  -0.241     -5.65*** 
ROA +  1.186  1.81**   0.977   2.26**   0.295       1.14 
LOSS - -0.617 -4.88***  -0.695  -7.50***  -0.888   -11.81*** 
CASH - -1.810 -5.33***  -1.902  -6.45***  -1.737     -8.06*** 
CRATE + -0.030 -0.24  -0.114  -1.03  -0.169     -2.01** 
ZSCORE +  0.123  2.29**   0.092   2.38***  -0.005     -0.28 
AGE +  0.012  2.29**   0.016   3.55***   0.015       5.20*** 
TANG +  0.382  1.11   0.570   1.57*   0.491          1.86** 
R&D - -3.039 -2.76***  -1.989  -2.68***  -1.864     -4.21*** 
TLCF - -0.077 -0.49  -0.230  -2.11**    0.007      0.22 
DIVIDEND + 10.176  1.81**   7.706   2.07**   8.828      2.66*** 
BIG6 -  -0.019 -0.12   0.129   1.16   0.027      0.32 
IND  Included  Included  Included 
YEAR   Included  Included  Included 
       
N  4,898  6,684  10,441 
Pseudo R2 (%)  25.52  31.41  30.12 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating equation (1) as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=2           (1) 
The dependent variable is the indicator variable DISSUE, which equals 1 if the firm’s net debt issuance is more than and 
any net equity issuance is less than 5 percent of total assets, and 0 if the firm’s net equity issuance is more than and any 
net debt issue is less than 5 percent of total assets. CON is the decile ranks of the proxies for conservatism, Rank_CR, 
Rank_Cscore, and Rank_NOPA. Controls is a set of control variables. IND and YEAR are industry and year dummies. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 2. Coefficients on the industry and year dummies are not tabulated for parsimony. The 
z-statistics are adjusted for firm and year clustering.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively, based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for directional (non-directional) prediction.   
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TABLE 4  
Changes in conservatism and the likelihood of debt versus equity financing 
 
 
 ΔCON = Rank_ΔCR 
(1)  
ΔCON = Rank_ΔCscore 
(2)  
ΔCON = Rank_ΔNOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coeff. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
Intercept +/-  1.010     1.87*   1.681        3.03***    1.526         2.49*** 
ΔCON +/- -0.091  -0.65  -0.478     -2.29**  -0.266        -3.24*** 
ΔPZ_score +/-  0.005   1.21  -0.002  -0.33   -0.001  -1.31 
ΔSTDRET -  0.225   0.33  -0.293 -0.68  -0.166  -0.49 
ΔTARGET_GAP + 0.163   0.29  1.017         2.82***     0.476      2.06** 
ΔLNASSET + -0.001  -0.01  -0.055 -0.28    0.371        3.72*** 
ΔMB - -0.195      -2.19**  -0.116     -2.19**  -0.017 -1.02 
ΔRET - -0.232        -2.71***  -0.197       -3.06***  -0.129       -2.52*** 
ΔROA + -1.651      -2.17**  -1.310     -2.26**  -0.341  -1.62* 
ΔLOSS - -0.142  -0.99  -0.162   -1.44*  -0.149    -2.19** 
ΔCASH - -0.412  -0.74  -0.386  -0.87   0.236   0.96 
ΔZSCORE +  0.258      1.95**   0.166       2.16**   0.040   1.32* 
ΔTANG +  0.042   0.05   1.035     1.49*   1.062      3.06*** 
ΔR&D - -0.553 -0.48  -0.458  -0.60   0.444    2.17** 
ΔTLCF - -0.832       -2.97***  -0.139  -1.20  -0.023 -0.72 
ΔDIVIDEND +  3.660      2.00**   1.510   0.77   0.609    1.32* 
IND  Included  Included  Included 
YEAR   Included  Included  Included 
       
N  3,905  5,336  8,555 
Pseudo R2 (%)  12.71  14.28  13.63 
       
Notes: This table reports the results using changes in, instead of levels of, conservatism in equation (1). The dependent 
variable is the indicator variable DISSUE, which equals 1 if the firm’s net debt issuance is more than and any net 
equity issuance is less than 5 percent of total assets, and 0 if the firm’s net equity issuance is more than and any net 
debt issue is less than 5 percent of total assets. ΔCON is measured as the difference in CON between year t and t-1, 
where CON is measured by CR, Cscore, or NOPA. We rank ΔCON based on deciles and standardize the decile ranks 
to range between zero and one (Rank_ΔCON). The control variables are as defined in Appendix 2 and are all measured 
as changes between year t and year t-1. Note that all independent variables are lagged one period from the period of 
measurement of the dependent variable, DISSUE. Coefficients on the industry and year dummies are not tabulated for 
parsimony. The z-statistics are adjusted for firm and year clustering.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 
5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for directional (non-directional) 
prediction.   
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Table 5  
Conservatism and the likelihood of debt versus equity financing: Using a Modified Basu (1997) measure of 
conservatism 
 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
 
Pred. 
sign 
Coeff. t-statistic 
 
Coeff. t-statistic 
 
Coeff. t-statistic 
Intercept 
 
+/- -0.003     -0.13 
 
-0.050      -1.75* 
 
-0.046     -1.68* 
D - -0.027     -4.00***  -0.026        -1.62**  -0.027       -1.74** 
Ret +  0.022      2.96***   0.069       3.66***   0.068       3.84*** 
D*Ret +  0.150      5.86***   0.332        5.83***   0.298       4.74*** 
DISSUE +/-  0.068    12.12***      0.050       8.46*** 
D*DISSUE +/-  0.023      3.72***      0.020       3.25*** 
Ret*DISSUE +/-  0.062      8.49***      0.067       7.59*** 
D*Ret*DISSUE +/- -0.100     -3.72***     -0.092      -3.93*** 
SIZE +/-     0.018   11.50***   0.015       8.77*** 
D*SIZE +/-     0.001    0.62   0.001      0.41 
Ret*SIZE +     0.009      3.19***   0.008       3.11*** 
D*Ret*SIZE -    -0.046     -4.90***  -0.041     -4.20*** 
LEV +/-    -0.041       -5.80***  -0.034       -5.17*** 
D* LEV +/-     0.013     1.32   0.008      0.92 
Ret* LEV  -     0.032         2.41**   0.016      1.36 
D*Ret* LEV +    -0.027     -0.88  -0.002     -0.08 
MB +/-    -0.000     -1.02  -0.000     -1.08 
D*MB +/-     0.001        1.63*   0.001        1.63* 
Ret*MB +     0.000      0.76   0.000       0.80 
D*Ret*MB -     0.001      1.24   0.001       1.23 
IND  Included 
Included 
 Included 
Included 
 Included 
Included YEAR    
          
N  23,517 
17.76 
 23,517 
18.48 
 23,517 
23.30 Adjusted R2 (%)    
D*Ret + 
D*Ret*DISSUE 
+/- 0.050 3.62***     0.206 4.01*** 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating equation (2) as follows: 
Xi,t = β1 + β2 Di,t + β3 Reti,t + β4 Di,t*Reti,t + β5 DISSUEi + β6 Di,t*DISSUEi + β7 Reti,t*DISSUEi  
+ β8 Di,t*Reti,t*DISSUEi + β9 SIZEi,t + β10 Di,t*SIZEi,t + β11 Reti,t* SIZEi,t + β12 Di,t*Reti,t*SIZEi,t  
+ β13 LEV i,t + β14 Di,t* LEV i,t + β15 Reti,t* LEV i,t + β16 Di,t*Reti,t* LEV i,t + β17 MBi,t  
+ β18 Di,t*MBi,t + β19 Reti,t* MBi,t + β20 Di,t*Reti,t*MBi,t + IND + YEAR + ei,t    (2) 
We identify debt and equity issuers using DISSUE in each year t, but further require that these firms do not issue any 
equity or debt over the years t-3 to t-1 to ensure a cleaner test. For each firm that issues equity or debt in year t, we 
use three years of data (i.e., year t-3 to t-1) to estimate equation (2). X is earnings scaled by lagged market value and 
Ret is fiscal year return. D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if return (i.e., Ret) is negative, and 0 if return is positive. 
DISSUE is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm’s net debt issuance is more than and any net equity issuance 
is less than 5 percent of total assets, and 0 if the firm’s net equity issuance is more than and any net debt issue is less 
than 5 percent of total assets. SIZE is firm size, LEV is leverage, and MB is the market-to-book ratio. IND and YEAR 
are industry and year dummies. All variables are as defined in Appendix 2. Coefficients on the industry and year 
dummies are not tabulated for parsimony. The t-statistics are adjusted for firm and year clustering. The table also 
provides the t-statistic for the sum of the coefficients on D*Ret and D*Ret*DISSUE. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for directional 
(non-directional) prediction.   
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TABLE 6  
Conservatism and costs of equity and debt  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
 N Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
Cost of Equity (COE)       
CR sample 2,737 0.130 0.108 0.086 0.139 0.172 
Cscore sample 3,581 0.127 0.110 0.086 0.144 0.083 
NOPA sample 4,187 0.124 0.104 0.076 0.143 0.131 
 
Cost of Debt (COD) 
 
     
CR sample 2,737 0.057 0.050 0.035 0.065 0.055 
Cscore sample 3,581 0.061 0.052 0.035 0.068 0.067 
NOPA sample 4,187 0.061 0.052 0.035 0.069 0.065 
 
 
Panel B: Cost of equity (COE) 
 
 CON = Rank_CR 
(1) 
CON = Rank_Cscore 
(2) 
CON = Rank_NOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
Intercept +/-  0.125       6.11***   0.126       8.41***  0.117     8.88*** 
CON - -0.101   -1.93**  -0.105      -7.64*** -0.048   -1.71** 
DISSUE +/-  0.018 1.11   0.002 0.36  0.003 0.31 
CON*DISSUE +/-  0.018     2.04**   0.034      2.31**  0.052    1.83** 
IND  Included Included Included 
YEAR   Included Included Included 
     
N  2,737 3,581 4,187 
Adj R2 (%)  4.14 12.01 3.74 
CON + CON*DISSUE 
 
- 
 
-0.083 
 
0.67 
 
-0.071 
 
9.00*** 
 
0.004 
 
0.46 
 
 
Panel C: Cost of debt (COD) 
 
 CON = Rank_CR 
(1) 
CON = Rank_Cscore 
(2) 
CON = Rank_NOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
Intercept +/-  0.096        6.94***   0.059       5.86***  0.094      9.63*** 
CON - -0.023 -1.20  -0.090     -4.95*** -0.022 -1.27* 
DISSUE +/- -0.056       -5.41***  -0.029      -3.33*** -0.061     -7.80*** 
CON*DISSUE +/-  0.019 1.00   0.082 1.49  0.018 1.61 
IND  Included Included Included 
YEAR   Included Included Included 
     
N  2,737 3,581 4,187 
Adj R2 (%)  21.10 22.26 21.10 
CON+ CON*DISSUE 
 
- 
 
-0.004 
 
2.37** 
 
-0.008 
 
3.32*** 
 
-0.004 
 
2.29** 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
Conservatism and costs of equity and debt  
 
Notes: Panel A reports the descriptive statistics on the cost of equity and cost of debt for each sample based on the 
three conservatism measures. Panels B and C report the results from estimating equations (3a) and (3b) as follows: 
CODi,t or COEi,t = a0 + a1CONi,t-1 + a2 DISSUEi,t + a3CONi,t-1 * DISSUEi,t + IND+ YEAR + e. COD is total interest 
expense divided by the sum of short-term and long-term debt. COE is implied cost of equity based on the PEG ratio. 
COD and COE are restricted to values between 0 and 1 to mitigate outliers. CON is the decile rank of the conservatism 
measures, Rank_CR, Rank_Cscore, and Rank_ NOPA. DISSUE equals 1 if the firm’s net debt issuance is more than 
and any net equity issuance is less than 5 percent of total assets, and 0 if the firm’s net equity issuance is more than 
and any net debt issue is less than 5 percent of total assets. IND and YEAR are industry and year dummies. All variables 
are as defined in Appendix 2. Coefficients on the industry and year dummies are not tabulated for parsimony. The t-
statistics are adjusted for firm and year clustering.  The table also reports t-statistic for the sum of the coefficients on 
CON and CON*DISSUE. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively, based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for directional (non-directional) prediction.   
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TABLE 7  
Effects of cross-sectional differences in information asymmetry on the relation between the likelihood of debt versus 
equity financing and conservatism 
 
Panel A: Financial intermediaries  
Analyst coverage (ANALYST) 
  
CON = Rank_CR 
(1)  
CON = Rank_Cscore 
(2)  
CON = Rank_NOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred. 
sign 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
CON - -0.475   -1.88**  -0.636     -1.42*  -0.234   -1.41*  
ANALYST - -0.409     -3.83***  -0.103     -0.82  -0.356   -4.43***  
CON*ANALYST +  0.048    1.68**  0.551    3.11***   0.047    3.43***  
N  3,543  4,834  6,681  
Pseudo R2 (%)  30.82  32.65  34.02  
 
Analyst dispersion (DISP) 
  
CON = Rank_CR 
(1)  
CON = Rank_Cscore 
(2)  
CON = Rank_NOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred. 
sign 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
CON - -0.180 -0.81  -1.654      -3.78***  -0.122 -1.13 
DISP +   2.282    1.41*    3.367  1.00   0.226    1.40* 
CON*DISP - -4.056     -2.00**  -4.382 -0.99  -0.421     -2.01** 
N  2,927  4,046  5,348 
Pseudo R2 (%)  29.12  32.09  31.85 
 
Dedicated institutional ownership (DEDINST) 
  
CON = Rank_CR 
(1)  
CON = Rank_Cscore 
(2)  
CON = Rank_NOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred. 
sign 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
CON - -0.319    -1.73**  -0.375 -1.22  -0.364 -2.98*** 
DEDINST - -0.010    -1.23  -0.057   -1.53*  -0.012   -2.06** 
CON*DEDINST +  0.023     1.51*  0.052       6.21***  0.011    1.53* 
N  3,845  5,040  7,291 
Pseudo R2 (%)  27.11  33.25  30.05 
 
Panel B: Growth opportunities 
Research and development expenditure (HIGH_R&D) 
  
CON = Rank_CR 
(1)  
CON = Rank_Cscore 
(2)  
CON = Rank_NOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred. 
sign 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
CON - -0.258      -2.31***  -0.828 -2.75***  -0.407 -3.00*** 
HIGH_R&D - -1.590 -0.84  -1.482    -1.95**  -0.609 -5.25*** 
CON*HIGH_R&D - -2.702   -1.34*  -0.450 -2.73***  -0.342 -2.26*** 
N  4,898  6,684  10,441 
Pseudo R2 (%)  25.57  31.53  32.78 
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TABLE 7 (Continued)  
Effects of cross-sectional differences in information asymmetry on the relation between the likelihood of debt versus 
equity financing and conservatism  
 
Tangible assets (TANG) 
  
CON = Rank_CR 
(1)  
CON = Rank_Cscore 
(2)  
CON = Rank_NOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred. 
sign 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
CON - -0.886      -3.54***  -1.429       -4.29***  -0.139  -1.04 
TANG + 0.320  0.72  0.289  0.54  1.698    7.73*** 
CON*TANG + 1.611      2.65***  1.541        2.73***  1.279    3.48*** 
N  4,898  6,684  10,441 
Pseudo R2 (%)  25.52  31.42  30.34 
 
Panel C: Micro-market-based measures of information asymmetry   
Market illiquidity (ILLIQ) 
  
CON = Rank_CR 
(1)  
CON = Rank_Cscore 
(2)  
CON =Rank_NOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred 
sign 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. 
z-
statistic 
CON - -0.309    -2.00**  -1.060   -3.58***  -0.358 -3.47*** 
ILLIQ + 0.761       6.56***  0.682     6.58***  0.392  6.15*** 
CON*ILLIQ - -0.235  -1.46*  -0.290    -2.28***  -0.229 -2.23*** 
N  4,739  6,482  10,046 
Pseudo R2 (%)  27.15  32.95  31.49 
 
Probability of informed trade (PIN) 
  
CON = Rank_CR 
(1)  
CON = Rank_Cscore 
(2)  
CON = Rank_NOPA 
(3) 
 
Pred. 
sign 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
 
Coef. z-statistic 
CON - -0.027     -0.11  -1.791     -4.04***  -0.215      -1.07 
PIN + 5.037  5.68***  1.390  1.43*  4.480      10.51*** 
CON*PIN - -2.335  2.61***  -3.866     -3.37***  -1.840     -2.18** 
N  4,631  6,337  9,816 
Pseudo R2 (%)  26.32  32.23  31.39 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating equation (4) as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=4  (4)  
In Panel A, IA captures information asymmetry based on financial intermediaries: analyst coverage (ANALYST), 
percent of shares held by dedicated institutional investors as defined in Bushee (1998) (DEDINST), and analyst 
forecast dispersion (DISP). In Panel B, IA captures information asymmetry based on growth opportunities: research 
and development expenditure (HIGH_R&D) and tangibility (TANG). In Panel C, IA captures information asymmetry 
based on market microstructure measures: illiquidity measure (ILLIQ) by Amihud (2002) and probability of informed 
trades (PIN) by Brown and Hillegeist (2007). DISSUE equals 1 if the firm’s net debt issuance is more than and any 
net equity issuance is less than 5 percent of total assets, and 0 if the firm’s net equity issuance is more than and any 
net debt issue is less than 5 percent of total assets. CON is the decile rank of the conservatism measures, Rank_CR, 
Rank_Cscore, and Rank_ NOPA. Controls is a set of control variables. IND and YEAR are industry and year dummies. 
All control variables are not tabulated for parsimony. All variables are as defined in Appendix 2. The z-statistics are 
adjusted for firm and year clustering.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively, based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for directional (non-directional) prediction.   
